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WATER LA W RE VIEW

awarded actual as well as punitive damages in the amount of $550,000.
The court awarded punitive damages because the defendant continued to pollute the aquifer during the years following the previous law
suit.
General Host appealed, alleging: 1) the plaintiffs' failure to appropriate water rights or obtain irrigation permits barred their nuisance
claim because plaintiffs sustained no actual damages; and (2) the punitive damages award was unfairly repetitious.
The court affirmed the district court's ruling on both the validity
of the nuisance claim and the appropriateness of the punitive damages
award. The court reversed the district court's ruling that plaintiffs'
failure to obtain appropriated water rights did not cause the plaintiffs'
inability to produce irrigated crops on their land.
Defendants asserted that plaintiffs did not have any water appropriation rights in the aquifer because they never received a permit.
The court determined that an appropriated right was not necessary to
claim nuisance. The court further determined that a finding of nuisance was not predicated on a finding of actual interference with use
of one's property. Since the defendants' contamination of the aquifer
would frustrate the potential future reasonable use of plaintiffs' property as irrigated land, plaintiffs were entitled to proceed with a nuisance claim.
The lack of water appropriation rights was not wholly irrelevant.
The district court correctly concluded that the failure to obtain appropriated water rights was a potential intervening cause for the plaintiffs' inability to grow irrigated crops on their land, rather than a complete bar to their nuisance claim.
The Court upheld the punitive damages award for the reasons
given by the district court - that the defendant had failed to stop polluting the aquifer following the original suit.
Heidi A. Anderson
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Dallas Creek appealed from an order of the Water Court for Water
Division No. 4 canceling its conditional water right for failure to timely
file an application for a finding of reasonable diligence. The Colorado
Supreme Court considered the circumstances under which amending
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an application for a conditional water right, previously filed by the
statutory deadline, renders that application void, thereby depriving the
water court of subject matter jurisdiction over the application.
In 1974, the water court granted a conditional decree for 10 cfs of
water for the Long Hill Pumping Plant at a specified point of diversion
on Dallas Creek. After transfer by the original owner, the decree was
continuously renewed and held by WRIKO, Inc. until 1993. In April
1993, the court notified WRIKO's owner that the decree was again up
for renewal. Plaintiff's non-lawyer agent timely filed the renewal application under the name of WRIKO in spite of the fact that the Dallas
Creek Company had taken possession of the Long Hill Pumping Plant.
In July 1993, the water court published public notice of the reasonable diligence application, and land owners in the Dallas Creek basin filed numerous statements of opposition. In September 1993, Dallas Creek entered an appearance. The water court allowed Dallas
Creek to participate for more than two years in discovery, motions, and
preparation for trial. Shortly before trial in January 1996, Dallas Creek
filed a formal motion to substitute Dallas Creek Company for WRIKO
as the real party in interest. The water court denied this motion holding that the application was untimely. The objectors moved to dismiss
the diligence application altogether alleging that WRIKO had been
dissolved in 1988 and, therefore, no real party in interest appeared as
an applicant within the diligence period. The water court agreed,
holding that the party on an application cannot be amended after the
filing deadline has passed. Therefore, because no real party in interest
had timely filed an application, the water court dismissed the case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Dallas Creek appealed, urging that as the user of the water right it
was entitled to proceed with the application as the real party in interest. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed, holding that the water
court abused its discretion in denying substitution of Dallas Creek as
the real party in interest. The court stated that the filing of a diligence
application, and subsequent public notice of that filing, "confers subject matter jurisdiction on the water court to proceed with a determination of reasonable diligence."
The court found the water court's strict construction of the submission requirements for diligence applications untenable, stating, "we
do not view party identification as an unalterable jurisdictional feature
of an application." The court based its opinion on two factors. First,
the statutes state that "any person" desiring a finding of reasonable
diligence may file an application. Second, Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) requires that actions be prosecuted by real parties in interest. In the court's opinion, Dallas Creek qualified as a real party in
interest because it was the actual user of the water right through its
ownership of the Long Hill Pumping Plant.
The court cited several reasons for its conclusion. First, the agent
who filed the diligence application for Dallas Creek was not a lawyer.
He filed the application under WRIKO because he thought he had to
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do so since the water court previously granted the decree under that
name. The application stated that Dallas Creek was the actual user of
the water right. The court found the law recognizes that "water rights
are decreed to structures and points of diversion," and that "the owners and users of such rights may change from time to time." Because
the agent would have listed Dallas Creek as the applicant had he
known he could do so, because Dallas Creek was the actual user of the
water right and owner of the point of diversion (the Long Hill Pumping Plant), and because courts expect that owners and users may
change, the court found Dallas Creek could be substituted for the
original applicant.
Second, the court found that the motion for substitution of applicants "neither misled nor substantially prejudiced" the objectors. The
applicant gave proper public notice, and that notice contained clarification that Dallas Creek was the actual user of the water. In addition,
Dallas Creek's lawyer appeared on its behalf, and worked on the case
for over two years. The court noted that, when justice so requires,
courts have allowed applicants for water rights to amend applications.
Finally, the court found that, under Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 15, "a substituted party benefits from the filing date of the original pleading" if adversely affected parties had sufficient notice to avoid
any prejudice. The objectors were aware that Dallas Creek was the
user of the water right, and that Dallas Creek's attorney represented
them in the diligence proceedings. The supreme court determined,
therefore, that Dallas Creek's substitution was effective as of the date
the agent filed the original diligence application.
The court remanded the case to the water court for determination
of whether Dallas Creek met the requirements for a finding of reasonable diligence and granting of a conditional decree.
DebbieEiland

Left Hand Ditch Co. v. Hill, 933 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1997) (holding that
shareholders in a mutual ditch company have a common law right to
inspect the company's shareholder list).
The Hills held shares in the Left Hand Ditch Company, a nonprofit corporation that provides water to its shareholders in the Niwot
region of Boulder County. In 1993, the Hills requested a copy of the
mutual ditch company's shareholder list. The Hills explained that
they wanted to inspect the shareholder list in order to sell or rent their
shares, to better understand Left Hand's future, and to better communicate with other shareholders.
Left Hand denied the Hills' request. Left Hand explained that it
wished to keep the list confidential and that it had alternate methods
available for assisting the Hills in renting or selling their shares.
The Hills filed suit in the Boulder County District Court seeking an

